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COMMENTS




The proliferation of multinational corporations continues to shrink the
world. Daily, the component divisions and subsidiaries of such corpora-
tions shift goods, services, and intangibles among themselves, despite the
national borders that separate them. The measurement and taxation of these
transactions perpetually challenge the taxing authorities of different na-
tions.' Universally, the world recognizes each nation's right to tax the eco-
nomic activity within its jurisdiction. However, if a corporation has
various sub-entities scattered around the globe, how much of that corpora-
tion's bottom line can each nation tax? For that matter, when a corporation
can shift its income and expenses across borders through these intercom-
* I would like to thank Prof. Charlotte Crane for suggesting this topic and Trey Hickman
for his patience and support.
' 12 MERTENS LAW OF FED. INCOME TAX Transfer Pricing: Section 482 § 451.01 (West
1997) [hereinafter MERTENS].
2 Pamela L. Kayfetz & Leo B. Helzel, Transfer Pricing: Achieving Fair National Taxa-
tion of International Transactions, 3 ANN. SUaV. INT'L & COMP. L. 193 (1996).
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pany transactions, how can each nation determine the true net income from
a corporation's activities within that country's jurisdiction? Multinational
taxpayers and the world's taxing authorities have been struggling with these
questions for decades, 3 but have been unable to agree upon any single, uni-
form jurisdictional approach . However, the dramatic internationalization
of business, accompanied by an exponential increase of the dollar amounts
in question, have brought new attention to this issue.5 The magnitude of the
problem has grown so that what was formerly an arcane province of tax gu-
rus attracted popular news media attention and became an issue in the 1992
U.S. presidential election.6 The Internal Revenue Service and members of
Congress have expressed concerns that certain types of intercompany cross-
border transactions have resulted in significant lost revenue for the United
States.7 Adding in the Internet's potential future impact, jurisdictional is-
sues have become one of the biggest taxation challenges heading into the
next century.8
Transfer pricing is the term used to describe the methods by which
multinational taxpayers account for transactions among subsidiaries and di-
visions in different countries.9 Historically, the world's taxing authorities
have worried about multinational corporations using intercompany transac-
tions to shift earnings among subsidiaries to avoid taxation. 0 Similarly,
corporations have been concerned about double taxation, that is, paying
taxes on the same income to two or more countries." In one 1995 survey,
eight out of ten companies identified transfer pricing as the biggest issue
facing multinational corporations today.1
2
3 Robert L. Palmer, Toward Unilateral Coherence in Determining Jurisdiction to Tax In-
come, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 6-7 (1989).
4 Id. at 30, (noting that global interest in international taxation issues began with an in-
crease in international trade during in the 1920's).
5 Dale W. Wickham & Charles J. Kerester, Tax Policy Forum: New Directions Needed
for Solution of the Transfer Pricing Tax Puzzle, 5 TAx NOTES INT'L 399, 401 (1992).
6 1d. at 400-01. See also Martin A. Sullivan, Transfer Pricing: Trouble Waiting to Hap-
pen?, 13 TAX NOTES INT'L 93, 93 (1996).
7 Arthur L. Nims, III, Tax Court Management of Jumbo Cases: The New Challenge, 38
FED. B. NEWS & J. 330 (1991). Projections of lost revenue have ranged from $100 million to
$10 billion, although Congressional experts have called this latter figure unrealistic. Sulli-
van, supra note 6.
8 Ernst & Young LLP, Transfer Pricing: Risk Reduction and Advance Pricing Agree-
ments, 10 TAx NOTEs INT'L 293, 293 (1995).
9 Kayfetz & Helzel, supra note 2, at 194.
1o Ernst & Young LLP, supra note 8, at 299. Of multinational corporations ("MNCs")
surveyed, 40% of British MNCs, 44% of German MNCs, 48% of Canadian MNCs, 50% of
U.S. MNCs, 56% of Australian MNCs, 70% of Japanese MNCs, and 72% of Dutch MNCs
considered transfer pricing to be the most important international tax issue they face.
1 This is especially the case when the competing jurisdictions do not harmonize their tax
rules. Wickham & Kerester, supra note 5, at 401.
12 Ernst & Young LLP, supra note 8, at 294.
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In the last ten years, the combined efforts of the United States Con-
gress and the Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS") have been a driving
force behind the increased attention paid to these issues globally.13 One of
the more interesting mechanisms that has emerged from this effort has been
the development of bilateral and multilateral advance pricing agreements
("APAs"). An advance pricing agreement is an arrangement between a tax-
payer and the IRS on the best method, within the meaning of Treasury
Regulations, for determining arm's length14 prices for intercompany trans-
actions, and the proper apsplication of that method to the taxpayer's specific
facts and circumstances. The IRS is not alone in its use of advance pric-
ing agreements. Several other nations have adopted similar processes,1 and
many advance pricing agreements are negotiated between the taxpayer and
two or more taxing authorities. 17 "The premise underlying the APA is that
U.S. and foreign jurisdictions cooperate to tax the company's international
affairs as one global business. '' 18 While hailed by many as a step in the
right direction toward addressing some disputes,1 advance pricing agree-
ments are not a panacea for resolving all transfer pricing issues, and are not
without controversy themselves.
1 Id. at 293-94.
14 An arm's length price is the amount that an unrelated party would have paid in the
same circumstances as in the controlled transaction. MERTENS, supra note 1, § 451.26. At
the heart of Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") § 482 is the requirement that related taxpayers
deal with one another on an arm's length basis. Id. at § 451.27. The arm's length concept is
accepted internationally with respect to transfer pricing. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise
and Fall of Arm's Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation, 15 VA.
TAx. REv. 89 (1995). The United States has been sharply criticized in recent years for treas-
ury regulations under IRC § 482 that allow the comparable profits method for transfer pric-
ing calculations, viewed as a move away from the arm's length concept. Sven-Olof Lodin,
Is the American Approach Fair? Some Critical Views on the Transfer Pricing Issues, 1995
INTERTAx 240, 242. However, many corporations view advance pricing agreements as a
way around the confusion created by conflicts between different methodologies. Id. at 243.
See also discussion of transfer pricing methodologies, infra note 56.
15 Rev. Proc. 96-53, 1996-2 C.B. 375, § 3.02.
16 See, e.g., Timothy W. Cox, Australian Tax Office Releases Draft Ruling on Advance
Pricing Agreements, 9 TAX NOTES INT'L 1279; Eleven Canadian APAs Completed, Thirty
More in Process, Official Says, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Mar. 31, 1997, at d7; Alber-
tina M. Fernandez, Mexico Issues First Maquiladora APA, 11 TAX NOTES INT'L 1276
(1995); John Turro, Netherlands Formalizes APA Procedures, 9 TAX NOTES INT'L 1531
(1994).
17 See, e.g., John Turro, IRS Inks Two Pricing Agreements in Derivative Products Area,
55 TAX NOTES 725 (1992).
18 Id.
19 Mike McIntyre, The Case for Public Disclosure ofAdvance Rulings on Transfer Pric-
ing Methodologies, 2 TAX NOTES INT'L 1127 (1990).
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. At present, the IRS does not publish advance pricing agreements, con-
tending that to do so would violate taxpayer confidentiality. 20 This policy
has been controversial since the inception of the program. 21 In 1996, the
Bureau of National Affairs ("BNA"), a Washington-based legal publisher,
filed suit against the IRS for the disclosure of advance pricing agreements
under Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") § 611022 and the Freedom of Infor-
mation Ace3 ("FOIA"). 24 Although the IRS recently conceded certain po-
sitions in an effort to settle the case,25 the parties continue to disagree on
major issues, 26 and various business interest have filed or requested the
right to file amicus briefs urging the judge to reject BNA's motion for
summary judgment and the IRS's concession.27
BNA argues that advance pricing agreements, as statements of policy
and legal interpretation, should be published for the benefit of other taxpay-
ers.28 Supporters of BNA's position also express concern that a secret body
of law is being developed with respect to transfer pricing, and that similarly
situated taxpayers may be treated unfairly as a result.29 However, if BNA's
suit is successful, the likely result will be the decline of the advance pricing
2 0 Letter dated May 29, 1996, from John B. Cummings, Asst. Chief Counsel, [IRS] Dis-
closure Litigation, to William A. Dobrovir, Esq., 96 TAX NOTES TODAY 115, 115-128 (1996)
[hereinafter Letter to William A. Dobrovir, Esq.].
21 See McIntyre, supra note 19, at 1127.
22 26 U.S.C.A. § 6110 (West 1997).
23 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 1997).24 BNA Complaint Demanding APAs, 96 TAx NOTES TODAY 42-33 (1996) (publishing
BNA's original complaint under IRC § 6110); IRS Issues Final Denial of Tax Analysts'
FOIA Request for APAs, 12 TAX NOTS INT'L 1929, 1929 (1996) (reporting BNA's amend-
ment to its complaint adding a claim for release of the information under FOIA).
25 See IRS Memorandum In Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment in
BNA v. IRS, Seeking Disclosure of Advance Pricing Agreements, DAILY TAX REP., Jan. 13,
1999, at L-8. [hereinafter IRS Memorandum In Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment]26 See, e.g., BNA's Memorandum In Opposition to IRS's Proposed Schedule for Redac-
tion and Release of Advance Pricing Agreements with Proposed Order, DAILY TAX REP.,
Feb. 23, 1999, at L-1 [hereinafter BNA's Memorandum In Opposition to IRS's Proposed
Schedule]; IRS's Reply to BNA 's Opposition to Service's Proposed Schedule for Redaction
and Release ofAPAs in BNA v. IRS, DAILY TAX REP., Mar. 3, 1999, at L-3 [hereinafter IRSs
Reply to BNA's Opposition].
27 See Motion by Three Companies for Leave to Participate as Amici Curiae in BNA's
APA Access Case Against IRS, DAILY TAX REP., Mar. 1, 1999, at L-5 [hereinafter Motion by
Three Companies for Leave to Participate as Amici Curiae];. Motion and Memorandum of
Tax Executives Institute Regarding Amicus Curiae Opposition to BNA Motion for Summary
Judgment Against IRS, DAILY TAX REP., Feb. 26, 1999, at L-1 [hereinafter Motion and
Memorandum of Tax Executives Institute Regarding Amicus Curiae Opposition].28 BNA Complaint Demanding APAs, supra note 24, at 26-28.
29 Mclntyre, supra note 19, at 1128-29.
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agreement program altogether,30 leaving taxpayers back where they started
before.31
The purpose of this comment is to review the role and function of the
advance pricing agreement process, to examine the merits of both sides' ar-
guments in the BNA suit, and to discuss the policy implications should
BNA prevail. While advance pricing agreements are not the ultimate solu-
tion to transfer pricing disputes and tax jurisdiction issues, they are a dis-
pute resolution tool worth maintaining, at least until Congress or Treasury
provides greater guidance in this area. Sufficient legal basis exists for the
courts to find against BNA and rule that advance pricing agreements are ex-
empt from publication under IRC § 6103. However, if the courts do not,
Congress should step in and make advance pricing agreements exempt for
policy reasons.
II. THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF THE ADVANCE
PRICING AGREEMENT PROCESS
A. Transfer Pricing Enforcement Before Advance Pricing Agreements
Compliance in the transfer pricing area has always been problematic.32
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the United States government made sev-
eral controversial attempts to address transfer pricing issues, starting with
modifications expanding the scope of IRC § 482 in the Tax Reform Act of
1986.33 In 1988, the Treasury Department issued a White Paper on Transfer
Pricing, calling for major changes in U.S. transfer pricing rules.34 In 1989
and 1990, Congress amended IRC § 6038A and added IRC § 6038C, ex-
panding the recordkeeping requirements for any U.S. corporation that is
25% foreign-owned, with specific penalties for failure to comply.35 Also in
1990, Congress added IRC §§ 6662(e) and (h), imposing severe penalties of
up to 40% on tax deficiencies resulting from transfer pricing adjustments.36
Since 1992, Congress has given the IRS additional funding to address trans-
30 Mitchell Tropin, APAs: Issuing Redacted Versions of APAs Seen as 'Administrative
Nightmare'for IRS, DAILY TAX REP., Aug. 5, 1996, at GI.
31 See infra Part II.A.
32 See, e.g., John Turro, Practitioners Find Harsh Rules in New Transfer Pricing Penalty
Regs, 62 TAX NOTS 806 (1994) (explaining the difficulties experienced with these sort of
regulations); Steven C. Wrappe, Advance Pricing Agreements: The IRS Rediscovers Alter-
native Dispute Resolution, 63 TAX NOTES 1343 (1994) (illustrating the problems involved in
resolving transfer pricing regulation violations).
33 See Kayfetz & Hezel, supra note 2, at 201.34 Treasury Dep't, A Study of Intercompany Pricing Under Section 482 of the Code
(1988), reprinted in Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.V. 458. See also Ernst & Young LLP, supra
note 8, at 293.35 See 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 6038A, 6038C (West 1997). See also Wrappe, supra note 32, at
n.6.36See 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 6662(e), (h) (West 1997). See also Wrappe, supra note 32, at n.6.
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fer pricing issues.37 Following Congress' lead, the Department of the
Treasury issued new regulations governing transfer pricing in 1992 and
1993;38 and the IRS hired additional international examiners and econo-
mists and increased the number of audits of foreign controlled corpora-
tions.
39
Despite all of the new efforts, settling transfer pricing disputes within
traditional IRS processes remains difficult.40 Congress and the IRS have
steadfastly avoided committing to objective standards for transfer pricing
calculations, preferring instead a facts and circumstances approach.4' Of-
ten, even after the IRS completes an audit and issues a deficiency notice,
the Commissioner's view of the issues is still evolving.42 The Tax Court
has been completely overwhelmed by the size and complexity of transfer
pricing litigation.43 Yet in several cases, the Tax Court has failed to endorse
any particular theory, resulting in even more confusion."4 Moreover, mem-
bers of the Tax Court hoped that its 1990 adoption of Rule of Practice and
Procedure 124 ("Rule 124"), allowing arbitration of valuation cases, would
ease the court's burden.45 Arbitration under Rule 124 has been used in
transfer pricing cases.46 However, it is not yet clear whether Rule 124 will
make a substantive difference in the Tax Court's backlog; and no one be-
lieves that Rule 124 will resolve the confusion surrounding transfer pricing
generally.47 The failure of Congress, the Treasury Department, and the IRS
to develop coherent and specific rules in this area have further exacerbated
this problem.48
37 Ernst & Young LLP, supra note 8, at 294.
38 Wrappe, supra note 32, at n.7.
39 Wrappe, supra note 32, at 1344.
40 Id. at 1347.
41 See Nims, supra note 7, at 33 1.
42 Id. at 333. "Yet, the Commissioner's view of the issues often can still be evolving
even after the deficiency notice is sent; his theories might not be fully formulated until he
has had an opportunity for some discovery." Nims, supra note 7, at 331.
43 C. David Swenson, International Tax Developments: Intercompany Pricing Issues, 314
PLI/TAx 447, 453 (1991). See, e.g., Seagate Technology, Inc. v. Commissioner, 102 T.C.
149 (1994).44 Matthew T. Adams, Advance Pricing Agreements: Rev. Proc. 91-22 - Possible Cer-
tainty Under Section 482, 314 PLI/TAX 49, 59 (1991). See, e.g., Sundstrand v. Commis-
sioner, 96 T.C. 226 (1991) (wherein the court adopted an approach for which neither party
had argued).
45 MERTENS, supra note 1, § 451.06.50. See also Wrappe, supra note 32.
46 See, e.g., Wrappe, supra note 32, at 1357 (discussing the outcome of the Apple Com-
puter case, resolved through arbitration under Rule 124).
47 
Id.
48 Wickham & Kerester, supra note 5, at 405 (noting the Tax Court's comments about
shifting IRS positions in Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 226 (1991)).
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B. The Advance Pricing Agreement Program As An Alternative
In 1990, looking for a solution to transfer pricing enforcement difficul-
ties, the IRS developed the advance pricing agreement program as an alter-
native dispute resolution tool.49 "The APA process is designed to be a
flexible problem-solving process, based on cooperative and principled ne-
gotiations between taxpayers and the [IRS]."50 In addition to taxpayer co-
operation, the IRS intended the program to encourage its own personnel
from various departments "to find common grounds to work together to
achieve collective goals." 51 Initially, suspicious tax executives of multina-
tional corporations had little interest in the program, calling the process too
cumbersome and time-consuming. 52 However, the severity of the potential
§ 6038 penalties, the ease with which they can be triggered, and the possi-
bility of audits and litigation have lead many foreign-based and U.S.-based
multinational corporations to seek advance pricing agreements. After Mat-
sushita Electric Industrial Co. of Japan successfully negotiated an advance
pricing agreement with the IRS, several other Japanese firms entered the
program as well 3 The program has grown in popularity with multinational
corporations seeking to minimize risk.
54
Following established guidelines 55, the taxpayer negotiates with the
IRS to establish agreed-upon transfer pricing methodology56 prior to the
filing of the corporation's tax return. The advance pricing agreement proc-
49 See Rev. Proc. 91-22, 1991-1 C.B. 526. Alternative dispute resolution methods are
used by government entities to settle disputes without litigation. Wrappe, supra note 32. "In
response to judicial delays, spiraling litigation costs, and generally unsatisfactory results for
all involved parties, a growing number of federal agencies have begun to employ ADR tech-
niques." Id. The U.S. government has found that ADRs promote settlements fair both to
government concerns and to other parties. Id. ADRs also curtail the government resources
required to resolve disputes. Id.
50 Rev. Proc. 96-53, 1996-2 C.B. 375-76, § 3.01.
51 Cym H. Lowell & Marc M. Levey, Critical APA Issues Explained and Updated in Rev.
Proc. 96-53, 8 J. INT'L TAx'N 74, 76 (1997).52 Large Companies Reconsidering Opposition to APAs, Practitioners Say, DAILY TAX
REP., Sept. 27, 1993, at J1.53 id.
" Ernst & Young LLP, supra note 8, at 293.
55 See Rev. Proc. 96-53, 1996-2 C.B. 376.
56 Transfer pricing methodologies have been a source of debate for several years, both in
the United States and among its trading partners. For example, United States and Japanese
tax laws currently utilize different methodologies. Akira Akamatsu, Japanese Competent
Authority Discusses U.S. APA Procedure, 14 TAx NOTES INT'L 1109, 1110 (1997). No clear
consensus has emerged as to what is the best method. Professor Avi-Yonah chronicles the
various methods used globally as well as the history of U.S. method regulations.
Avi-Yonah, supra note 14. He notes that one of the problems historically has been that no
one method is especially accurate for all taxpayers, or even for all transactions for a single
taxpayer. Id. at 141. Professor Avi-Yonah sees advance pricing agreements as a potential
solution for this problem. Id. at 154.
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ess begins with one or more prefiling conferences where the taxpayer and
the IRS discuss what information the IRS would require to reach an agree-
ment.5 7 Then, if the taxpayer elects to pursue an advance pricing agreement,
it must submit a formal request including proposed transfer pricing meth-
odologies and a user fee.58 Each proposed transfer pricing methodology
must be supported by relevant pricing data from comparable uncontrolled
transactions or other similar dealings. 9 Furthermore, each proposed trans-
fer pricing methodology must be demonstrated by its application to the ap-
plicant's tax and financial data for the past three years, if available, or else
projected or hypothetical data.60 The proposal must also include detailed
information about the corporation's history, organizational structure and
capitalization, and financial arrangements; income tax returns; research, de-
velopment, production, and technology acquisition cost detail; pricing, dis-
tribution, and licensing agreements; marketing studies; and a slew of other
internal reports, documentation, and analyses.6 1 An IRS team will analyze
the data provided by the taxpayer, along with other relevant information.62
Altogether, once the taxpayer has submitted a formal request, the evaluation
and negotiation process is expected to take six to nine months,63 although it
may take longer.64 As a result of these negotiations, the taxpayer and the
IRS may agree upon a transfer pricing methodology and enter into an ad-
vance pricing agreement.65  Although an advance pricing agreement can
cover all of a corporation's operations, often they are focused more nar-
rowly on a particular market or product niche.66
57 Rev. Proc. 96-53, 1996-2 C.B. 376, § 4.01.
58 Rev. Proc. 96-53, 1996-2 C.B. 376-77, §§ 5.01(4), 5.02. The user fee for each separate
request is $5,000 for taxpayers with gross income less than $100 million, $15,000 for tax-
payers with gross income between $100 million and $1 billion, and $25,000 for taxpayers
with gross income exceeding $1 billion. Requests involving more than one foreign jurisdic-
tion are deemed multiple bilateral requests. In such cases, the user fee for the first request is
determined as above, and the fee for each subsequent bilateral request will be no more than
$7,500. Rev. Proc. 96-53, 1996-2 C.B. 380, § 5.14(10).59 Rev. Proc. 96-53, 1996-2 C.B. 376-77, §§ 3.03, 5.02.
60 Rev. Proc. 96-53, 1996-2 C.B. 377, § 5.02.
61 See Rev. Proc. 96-53, 1996-2 C.B. 377-78 §§ 5.03(4)-5.08. The items listed above are
only a few of those included in the detailed listing of required documentation stretching over
several pages in this Revenue Procedure. However, they are representative of the proprie-
tary nature of the information that must be disclosed by a taxpayer to the IRS during the ad-
vance pricing agreement process.62 Wrappe, supra note 32.
63 id.
64 Negotiations for the advance pricing agreements obtained by Sumitomo Bank Capital
Markets, Inc., and Barclays Bank PLC took approximately eighteen months. Turro, supra
note 17, at 725.
65 Wrappe, supra note 32.
66 Large Companies Reconsidering Opposition to APAs, Practitioners Say, supra note 52,
at J1.
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Because of the sensitivity of the information that must be disclosed to
the IRS, participants in the advance pricing agreement program have ex-
pressed great concern for the confidentiality of that data. For now, given
the success of the program, many have concluded that the benefits of ad-
vance pricing agreements outweigh those concerns. But publication of ad-
vance pricing agreements could tilt the scale the other way.
C. The International Perspective
Transfer pricing, by its nature, is not just a problem in the United
States; everything Congress and the IRS do in this area influences the ac-
tions of other taxing authorities.68 Historically, the United States has been
the leader in transfer pricing issues, setting the standard for other nations to
follow.69 In response to the increased attention paid to transfer pricing in
the U.S., other countries have followed suit.70 "If there is a global tax war
today - and many believe there is - the declaration of war occurred in
1986 when the U.S. revised its statutory transfer pricing rules." 71 Canada,
Australia, the United Kingdom, and Japan have all passed new legislation,
revised administrative rules, and expanded their own enforcement efforts in
this area as well. 2 Several countries have developed their own advance
pricing agreement processes, including Australia, Canada, the Netherlands,
Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom.73
The most exciting trend has been the proliferation of bilateral and mul-
tilateral advance pricing agreements. Over the last 50 years, an extensive
network of bilateral tax treaties between various nations has developed,
supplemented by multinational guidelines established by organizations like
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (the
"OECD").74 These treaties generally contain so-called "mutual agreement
67 Ernst & Young LLP, supra note 8, at 294.
68 Palmer, supra note 3, at 20; see also Lodin, supra note 14, at 240.
69 See Lodin, supra note 14, at 240 (discussing the influence historically of United States
transfer pricing regulations on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment ("OECD") and European nations); Joseph A. Guttentag & Toshio Miyatake, Transfer
Pricing: US. and Japanese Views, 8 TAX NOTES INT'L 375 (1994).
70 Ernst & Young LLP, supra note 8, at 293.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 294. Note, however, that Japan's preconfirmation system, similar to the U.S. ad-
vance pricing agreement program, was introduced in 1987, four years before the U.S. pro-
gram was established. Akamatsu, supra note 56. But see Akiri Akamatsu, Japanese NTA
Announces Stepped-Up Enforcement of Transfer Pricing Regulations, 7 TAX NOTES INT'L
1094 (1993) ("Japan's National Tax Administration (NTA) has announced a policy of even
more thorough enforcement of the country's transfer pricing regulations....The present policy
has been viewed as 'retaliatory taxation' vis-a-vis the new U.S. temporary regulations.")
73 Ernst & Young LLP, supra note 8, at 293.
74 See generally T. Modibo Ocran, Double Taxation Treaties and Transnational Invest-
ment: A Comparative Study, 2 TAANSNAT'L LAW 131 (1989).
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procedure" provisions facilitating cooperation between the parties to resolve
double taxation claims of taxpayers.7 The purpose of such provisions is to
allow taxTayers to request assistance from tax authorities to relieve double
taxation. Utilizing these mutual agreement procedures, multinational cor-
porations have worked successfully with the taxing authorities of two or
more countries simultaneously, developing transfer pricing methodologies
that are satisfactory to all the parties involved.77 Various taxing authorities
have joined together to encourage this trend. For example, in October
1994, the taxing authorities of Canada, Australia, Japan, and the United
States reached agreements on common procedures for bilateral advance
pricing agreements, including simultaneous submission of the same infor-
mation by taxpayers to all the authorities involved.78 The taxing authorities
of Mexico, Germany, and The Netherlands have also developed advance
pricing agreement procedures.79
Involving other taxing authorities in the advance pricing agreement
process makes sense because the transactions under scrutiny involve more
than one jurisdiction. With unilateral advance pricing agreements in which
the other side of the transaction involves a treaty partner, the U.S. will at-
tempt to obtain a correlative adjustment from the treaty country's taxing
authority.80 However, just because the IRS agrees to a particular transfer
pricing methodology does not guarantee that the taxing authoriy on the
other side of the transaction will adjust its assessment accordingly. 1 There-
fore, bilateral and multilateral advance pricing agreements have the advan-
75 See, e.g., Convention Between the United States of America and Japan for the Avoid-
ance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on In-
come, May 4, 1954, U.S.-Japan, art. XVIII; Convention Between the United States of
America and the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income, Dec. 18, 1992, U.S.-Neth.,
art. 29, Senate Treaty Doc. 6, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. See also Robert T. Cole & Steven A.
Musher, Introduction to Tax Treaties and Competent Authority Mechanism, C694 ALI-ABA
93, 108 (1991) (discussing mutual agreement procedure provisions generally).
76 Rev. Proc. 96-13, 1996-1 C.B. 616, § 2.01.
77 See, e.g., Simon Phillipson, Australia Enters Multilateral Advance Pricing Agreement,
2 J. INT'L TAX'N 116 (July/Aug. 1991) (discussing agreement involving the Australian
Taxation Office, the United States Internal Revenue Service, and Apple Computer Australia
Pty Ltd.); Sunghak Andrew Baik & Michael Patton, Japan Steps Up Transfer Pricing En-
forcement: Joins the APA Fray, 11 TAx NOTEs INT'L 1271, 1273 (1995) (discussing various
agreements to which the Japanese National Tax Administration has been a party, including
an agreement with the United States Internal Revenue Service and Matsushita Electric In-
dustrial Co.); Turro, supra note 17 (discussing agreements involving the United Kingdom's
Inland Revenue, the IRS, and both Barclay's Bank PLC and Sumitomo Bank Capital Mar-
kets, Inc.).78 Blake Murray & Andrew Kingissepp, Advance Pricing Agreements: Pros and Cons, 5
CANADIAN CURR.ENT TAX 26 (1994).
79 Ernst & Young LLP, supra note 8, at 294.
80 Lowell & Levey, supra note 51, at 77.
81 Akamatsu, supra note 72, at I 110.
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tage of eliminating double taxation while also eliminating the risk of audits,
litigation, and penalties.82 Recognizing the benefits of bilateral and multi-
lateral advance pricing agreements, the IRS has adopted policies discour-
aging unilateral advance pricing agreements.83 For example, Revenue
Procedure 96-53 states that the IRS may provide information obtained
through the advance pricing agreement process to the tax authorities of
treaty partners even if a unilateral agreement is sought8 4
Advance pricing agreements are not suitable for all multinational tax-
payers. Because the process is expensive, participation in the program has
been limited primarily to large multinationals, leaving smaller corporations
to struggle with more traditional approaches.85 As taxpayers and the IRS
gain more experience and the process matures, advance pricing agreements
should become less costly.86 Nevertheless, advance pricing agreements of-
fer only a stop-gap solution for taxpayers seeking predictability in the ab-
sence of clearly defined policies and guidelines from the world's taxing
authorities.87
IMl. BNA v. IRS
On February 27, 1996, BNA filed suit in United States. District Court
for the District of Columbia requesting that advance pricing agreements be
released under IRC § 6110 as written determinations.88 On April 3, 1996,
BNA amended its complaint to include a similar request under FOIA sub-
section (a)(2).89 BNA filed the lawsuit after their administrative request for
public release was denied by the IRS on grounds of taxpayer confidentiality
under IRC § 6103.90
A. The General Rule of Publication and Confidentiality
FOIA subsection (a)(2) generally requires that statements of policy and
interpretations of law which have been adopted by a federal agency must be
8 See id. at 1110; McIntyre, supra note 19, at 1128; Murray & Kingissepp, supra note
78, at 26.
83 Akamatsu, supra note 72, at I 110.
84 Rev. Proc. 96-53, 1996-2 C.B. 381, § 7. This position is consistent with the mutual
agreement procedures in the various bilateral tax treaties discussed in the text accompanying
notes 75 and 76, supra.
85 Large Companies Reconsidering Opposition to APAs, Practitioners Say, supra note 52,
at JI. Some advance pricing agreements have cost more than $2 million in attorney and
economist fees. Id.
86 Id.
87 Wickham & Kerester, supra note 5, at 401.
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made available for public inspection and copying.91 FOIA subsection (b)(3)
excludes from this general rule matters specifically exempted from disclo-
sure by other statute,92 but "'any reasonably segregable portion of a record'
must be produced after deletion of the exempt portion. '
IRC § 6103 governs confidentiality and disclosure, preventing officers
and employees from revealing "returns" or "return information. 94 It is well
accepted at law that IRC § 6103 is the type of statute contemplated by
FOIA § 552(b)(3). 95 Thus, FOIA cannot be used to compel disclosure of
any ififormation exempted by IRC § 6103, including returns and return in-
formation.96 The courts have interpreted § 6103 broadly so as to include
9'5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (a)(2) (West 1997) ("Each agency, in accordance with published
rules, shall make available for public inspection and copying ... (3) those statements of
policy and interpretations which have been adopted by the agency and are not published in
the Federal Register.")
92 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (b)(3) (West 1997)
This section does not apply to matters that are ... (3) specifically exempted from
disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute
(A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave
no discretion on the issue, or (3) establishes particular criteria for withholding or re-
fers to particular types of matters to be withheld.
93 Tax Analysts v. Internal Revenue Service, 117 F.3d 607, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)).
94 26 U.S.C.A. § 6103 (West 1997). This provision contains extensive definitions of both
"return" and "return information." Only the definition of the latter is relevant to the BNA
case:
§ 6103(b)(2) Return information. - The term "return information" means -
(A) a taxpayer's identity, the nature, source or amount of his income, payments, re-
ceipts, deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax
withheld, deficiencies, overassessments, or tax payments, whether the taxpayer's re-
turn was, is being, or will be examined or subject to other investigation or processing,
or any other data, received by, recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or collected by
the Secretary with respect to a return or with respect to the determination of the exis-
tence, or possible existence, of liability (or the amount thereof) of any person under
this title for any tax, penalty, interest, fine, forfeiture, or other imposition, or offense,
and
(3) any part of any written determination or any background file document relating to
such written determination (as such terms are defined in section 6110(b)) which is not
open to public inspection under 6110, but such term does not include data in a form
which cannot be associated with, or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a par-
ticular taxpayer. Nothing in the preceding sentence, or in any other provision of law,
shall be construed to require the disclosure of standards used or to be used for the se-
lection of returns for examination, or data used or to be used for determining such
standards, if the Secretary determines that such disclosure will seriously impair as-
sessment, collection, or enforcement under the internal revenue laws.
95 Church of Scientology of California v. Internal Revenue Service, 484 U.S. 9, 14-15
(1987). See also Tax Analysts, 117 F.3d at 611; Aronson v. Internal Revenue Service, 973
F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1992); Linsteadt v. Internal Revenue Service, 729 F.2d 998, 1000 (5th Cir.
1984); Fruehauf Corp. v. IRS, 566 F.2d 574, 578 (6th Cir. 1977).96 See Church of Scientology of California, 484 U.S. at 18.
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virtually all data collected by the IRS with respect to a taxpayer's tax liabil-
ity.
97
As an exception to this general rule, IRC § 6103(b)(2), 98 known as the
Haskell Amendment,99 expressly excludes from the definition of "return in-
formation" "data in a form which cannot be associated with, or otherwise
identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer."' ° Congress included
the Haskell Amendment language to allow the IRS to publish statistical
studies and compilations of data that do not identify individual taxpayers.01
Like the rest of IRC § 6103, the courts have interpreted the Haskell
Amendment narrowly, with great deference to taxpayer confidentiality.102
"[W]ithout clear taxpayer understanding that the government takes the
strongest precautions to keep tax information confidential, taxpayers' con-
fidence in the federal tax system might erode, with harmful consequences
for a tax system that depends heavily on voluntary compliance.'10 3  In
Church of Scientology, the Supreme Court held that merely removing the
taxpayer's name and other identifying data is not enough to remove a
document from the "return information" classification. 1' 4 The Supreme
Court's Church of Scientology interpretation of the Haskell Amendment has
been taken to mean that the IRC § 6103(b)(2) exception is strictly limited to
statistical studies and other composite products. 0 5 However, more recently,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has
held that the legal analyses sections contained in field service advice memo-
randa fall within the Haskell Amendment's exception and are not "return
information," even though they may pertain to an individual taxpayer.
10 6
Because merely deleting identifying data is inadequate to make return
information discloseable under § 6103, the IRS has no obligation under
FOIA to undertake a more detailed redaction to render it so.10 7 However, at
the same time that Congress passed IRC § 6103, however, it also enacted
IRC § 6110, requiring that all letter rulings, other written determinations,
97 J. Hudson Duffalo, The Buttoned Lip: The Controversy Surrounding the Disclosure of
Tax Return Information, 53 ALB. L. REv. 937, 955 (1989).
9' 26 U.S.C.A. § 6103(b)(2) (West 1997).
99 Church of Scientology of California, 484 U.S. at 12.
'00 26 U.S.C.A. § 6103(b)(2) (West 1997).
101 Church of Scientology of California, 484 U.S. at 16.
10 2 Id. See also Aronson v. Internal Revenue Service, 973 F.2d 962 (1st Cir. 1992); King
v. IRS, 688 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1982); Currie v. IRS, 704 F.2d 523 (1 lth Cir. 1983).
103 Aronson, 973 F.2d at 966.
'04 Church of Scientology of California, 484 U.S. at 18.
o Tax Management Portfolios No. 632 Obtaining Information from the Government -
Disclosure Statutes and Discovery, 632 TM II.B.3.c.(5) (1998) [hereinafter Tax Management
Portfolios No. 632].
106 Tax Analysts v. Internal Revenue Service, 117 F.3d 607, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
107 Church of Scientology of California, 484 U.S. at 14.
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and related background file documents be made available to the public.
10 8
The intent of Congress in passing IRC § 6110 was to provide the public ac-
cess to certain IRS documents without following the FOIA procedures.1' 9
In the past twenty-five years, several cases have been decided with respect
to IRC § 6110 requiring the IRS to make available various documents in re-
dacted form for public use: private letter rulings, technical advice memo-
randa, related correspondence with taxpayers, and index-digest card
summaries of rulings' 10 general counsel's memoranda, technical memo-
randa, and actions on decisions;' and field service advice memoranda
12
Although these documents do not have precedential value, they provide
valuable insight into how the Treasury Department and IRS interpret the
law."3 Documents covered by IRC § 6110 must be requested under that
section and cannot be obtained through FOJA because they are confidential
and non-discloseable under § 6103.11
B. BNA's Arguments for Publishing Advance Pricing Agreements
In its original complaint, BNA alleges that advance pricing agreements
are "written determinations" under § 6110." s Accordingly, BNA argues
that advance pricing agreements, as statements of policy and legal interpre-
tation, should be published for the benefit of other taxpayers.
Advance Pricing Agreements memorialize in writing determinations
by the [Internal Revenue Service] to adopt particular transfer pricing
methodologies to assist in the calculation of tax liabilities. Advance
10826 U.S.C.A. § 6110(a) (West 1997)
(a) General rule. - Except as otherwise provided in this section, the text of any written
determination and any background file document relating to such written determina-
tion shall be open to public inspection at such place as the Secretary may by regula-
tions prescribe.
(b)(1) Written determination. - The term "written determination" means a ruling, de-
termination letter, or technical advice memorandum.
(b)(2) Background file document. - The term "background file document" with re-
spect to a written determination includes the request for that written determination,any written material submitted in support of the request, and any communication
(written or otherwise) between the Internal Revenue Service and persons outside theInternal Revenue Service in connection with such written determinaton....
p'9 Fruehauf Corp. v. Internal Revenue Service, 566 F.2d 574, 577 (6th Cir. 1977).
'1 Tax Analysts and'Advocates v. Internal Revenue Service, 505 F.2d 350, 352-53 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
" Taxation with Representation Fund v. Internal Revenue Service, 485 F. Supp. 263,
266 (D.C.Cir. 1980).
1
2 Tax Analysts v. Internal Revenue Service, 117 F.3d 607, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
113 Tax Management Portfolios No. 632, supra note 105, at II.C. 1.
"4 Grenier v. U.S. Internal Revenue Service, 449 F. Supp. 834, 840-41 (D. Md. 1978);
Conway v. United States Internal Revenue Service, 447 F. Supp. 1128, 1132 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
15 BNA Complaint Demanding APAs, supra note 24, at 26-28.
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Pricing Agreements memorialize transfer pricing methodologies not
specified in IRS regulations but still acknowledged by the IRS as
achieving an arm's length result. Public access to Advance Pricing
Agreements between the IRS and taxpayers would be useful to nu-
merous other taxpayers." 6
BNA later amended its complaint to add a claim under FOIA subsec-
tion (a)(2).
C. The IRS Position Against Publishing Advance Pricing Agreements
The IRS defends its position on several grounds. As expected, the IRS
contends that advance pricing agreements and related requested background
file documents are "return information" under IRC § 6103, and thus exempt
from disclosure under FOIA § 552(b)(3). 1 7 This line of argument follows
the same path as the case law concerning other IRS documents. " s But the
IRS also brings up some new arguments unique to advance pricing agree-
ments.
The IRS argues that advance pricing agreements satisfy other FOIA
exemption provisions.119 First, the IRS maintains that disclosure is exempt
under FOIA § 552(b)(3) because of the secrecy clauses of income tax trea-
ties and conventions. 2°
Although a treaty is not a 'statute,' under Article VI of the United
States Constitution, self-executing treaties, such as tax treaties, are
placed on an equal footing with federal statutes. ... Thus, the secrecy
clauses require that exchanged information be withheld from the public
in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue.
12 1
Additionally, the IRS points to FOIA § 552(b)(4) requiring the with-
holding of matters that are "trade secrets and commercial or financial in-
formation obtained from a person and privileged or confidential" because
"disclosure would be likely.., to cause substantial harm to the competitive
position of the person from whom the information was obtained."122 The
IRS points out that the types of information submitted by taxpayers through
the advance pricing agreement process are considered extremely sensitive
" 61d. at 13-15.
17 Letter to William A. Dobrovir, Esq., supra note 20, quoting the IRC § 6103(b)(2)(A)
definition of "return information": "APAs and the withheld 'background file documents' are
'data, received by, [or] recorded by... the Secretary with respect to ... the determination of
the existence, or possible existence, of liability...' of a particular taxpayer."
11S ee, e.g., Tax Analysts v. Internal Revenue Service, 117 F.3d 607, 611 (D.C. Cir.
1987)
19 Letter to William A. Dobrovir, Esq., supra note 20.
120 Id.
121 id.
12Id. (citing Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(en banc)).
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by the taxpayers involved.123 Finally, the IRS makes other FOIA claims of
deliberative process privilege and attorney-client privilege. 124
D. Analysis of the Merits
In the present case, the first question will be whether advance pricing
agreements constitute "return information" under § 6103 and are therefore
partially exempt from publication under FOIA. With respect to BNA's
FOIA claim, IRC § 6103 is well established at law as a FOIA subsection
(b)(3) exception to subsection (a)(2). 125 Given the narrow interpretation of
the Haskell Amendment by the Supreme Court, 126 it seems unlikely that ad-
vance pricing agreements will meet that exception. To the extent that ad-
vance pricing agreements contain segregable legal analysis sections
applicable to many taxpayers, the recent Tax Analysts opinion supports a
holding that those portions would be accessible through FOIA under the
Haskell Amendment exception. However, the transfer pricing methodology
analysis of interest to other taxpayers involves the weighing of the request-
ing taxpayer's individual factors, the very data which is most confidential
and identifiable.
The better case for publishing advance pricing agreements falls under
BNA's IRC § 6110 claim that the agreements are written determinations.
However, a comparison of advance pricing agreements with other IRS
documents which fall under IRC § 6110 demonstrates that they are distin-
guishable.
Private letter rulings are one type of IRS document that must be pub-
lished under IRC § 61 10.127 Similar to advance pricing agreements, private
letter rulings are issued by the IRS at the request of individual taxpayers
seeking guidance in advance of a contemplated transaction.121 Private letter
rulings typically include a short summary of the facts and circumstances of
the transaction, followed by a recitation and analysis of the relevant law,
and then a conclusion applying the law to the facts. A private letter ruling
is only binding on the individual taxpayer making the request, and does not
require the taxpayer to undertake the proposed transaction should the IRS
give an adverse ruling.129 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found,
123 Id. (citing Ernst & Young LLP, supra note 8). See also Wrappe, supra note 32.
124 Letter to William A. Dobrovir, Esq., supra note 20. The IRS has frequently made
these claims in other cases, with little success. See, e.g., Tax Analysts v. Internal Revenue
Service, 117 F.3d 607, 616-20 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Accordingly, these claims seem largely pro
forma and unlikely to succeed here, either.
125 See discussion supra part II.A.
126 id.
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therefore, that private letter rulings are not return information under IRC
§ 6103, but instead are documents generated by the IRS.130 Accordingly,
private letter rulings are publishable once the taxpayer's confidential infor-
mation has been deleted.13
In a recent analogous case, the parties asserted claims concerning field
service advice memoranda similar to those made by BNA with respect to
advance pricing agreements. 32 Field service advice memoranda are used
by the IRS to advise its agents on matters of law.13 3 IRS field personnel re-
quest legal guidance from the Office of Chief Counsel with respect to a
specific taxpayer situation. 34 As with private letter rulings, field service
advice memoranda contain a segregable legal analysis section. The Court
found, among other things, that the legal analysis portion of field service
advice memoranda did not qualify as "return information" under IRC
§ 6103, and thus was not exempt from publication under FOIA
§ 552(b)(3). 3 5
Private letter rulings and field service advice memoranda are distin-
guishable from advance pricing agreements, however. First, private letter
rulings and field service advice memoranda are one-sided issuances of
opinion from the IRS: The taxpayer or field agent requests a legal conclu-
sion for a given set of facts, and the IRS responds with its answer. In con-
trast, advance pricing agreements involve two-party negotiation toward a
compromise between the taxpayer and the IRS. Additionally, both private
letter rulings and field service advice memoranda generally address only the
interpretation of the law with respect to a discrete set of facts and circum-
stances. In contrast, because Congress, the Treasury Department, and the
IRS have been unwilling to commit to a particular transfer pricing method-
ology, advance pricing agreements focus primarily on analysis of the facts
and circumstances themselves. In other words, the insights to be gained
from published advance pricing agreements rest in the facts and circum-




13 2 Tax Analysts v. Internal Revenue Service, 117 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
133 Id. at 608.
134 id.
Each FSA includes a statement of issues, a conclusions section, a statement of facts,
and a legal analysis section. The staff preparing an FSA are instructed that the con-
clusions section should recommend a position on each issue and state 'any limitations
or conditions to which a conclusion may be subject.' The style of the analysis section'should be exploratory and descriptive so that the strengths and weaknesses of a case
are presented and developed candidly, directing attention to the authorities against the
conclusions arrived at as well as those which support them.'
Id. (citing the Chief Counsel Directives Manual (35)(19)44 (1992)) (footnote omit-
ted).
131 Id. at 616.
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Moreover, even under § 6110, identifying details must be deleted. 3 6
Identifying details include "information that would permit a person gener-
ally knowledgeable with respect to the appropriate community to identify
any person."' 7 The "appropriate community" has been defined as "that
group of persons who would be able to associate a particular person with a
category of transactions of which one is described in the written determina-
tion or background file document." 138 Presumably, given the kind of factual
information upon which transfer pricing methodologies are based, the tax-
payer's competitors would be able to identify the taxpayer involved by
looking at the advance pricing agreement unless such information was re-
dacted as well. By the time the IRS deleted the exempt information so as to
meet the requirements of §§ 6103 and 6110, it is questionable whether
enough information would be left to provide guidance to anyone.
Advance pricing agreements are not the only such documents not pub-
lished. Rule 124 arbitration reports are submitted to the Tax Court, and
thus become public records. 39 However, since these reports contain only
bottom line figures, the underlying data is kept out of the public domain.
Similarly, closing agreements, administrative settlements reached by the
IRS and taxpayers as part of the audit process, are not published, either.
141
Like advance pricing agreements, closing agreements are negotiated be-
tween the taxpayer and the IRS. The arguments made by BNA with respect
to advance pricing agreements could similarly be made with respect to the
Rule 124 arbitration reports and closing agreements, yet these documents
are considered protected. Ultimately, advance pricing agreements are suffi-
ciently distinguishable from field service advice memoranda, private letter
rulings, and other IRS determinations that have to be published, so that they
fall within the scope of § 6103, and outside the scope of § 6110, and there-
fore should not be published.
E. Recent Developments
In a brief filed in January 1999 opposing BNA's request for summary
judgment, the IRS conceded that APAs are written determinations for pur-
poses of § 6110.142 Some tax practitioners expressed surprise at the IRS's
decision to change its longstanding position on the issue suggesting that
136 26 U.S.C.A. § 61 10(c)(1) (West 1997).
137 See 29 C.F.R. § 301.6110-6.
138 Tax Management Portfolios No. 632, supra note 105, at II.C.3.a.
139 Carlton M. Smith, Innovative Settlement Techniques Can Reduce Litigation Costs, 78
J. TAX'N 76, 78 (1993).
140 id.
141 See S. Rep. No. 94-938, pt. 2 at 307 (1976); H.R. Rep. No. 94-658, pt.2, at 316
(1976).
14 2 See IRS Memorandum In Opposition to Plaintijf's Motion for Summary Judgment, su-
pra note 25, at L-8.
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many of the agency's arguments had merit.1 43 The IRS's concession will
permit the publication of redacted APAs.144 However, the IRS has not
abandoned its position that much of the information included in the APAs is
protected from disclosure by § 6103.145 Additionally, the IRS continues to
claim that portions of the APAs are protected as trade secrets, and that parts
of bilateral and multilateral APAs are protected by tax treaty secrecy provi-
sions or are protected by trade secrets. 146 Meanwhile, BNA and the IRS
continue to haggle over the terms for redacting and releasing the APAs.
147
The judge in the case, United States Magistrate Judge John M. Fac-
ciola, has not yet ruled on BNA's summary judgment motion, although he
has allowed BNA to propose a schedule for redaction and release of
APAs.148 A non-profit organization representing business interests, the Tax
Executives Institute Inc., has filed an amicus brief asking the court to reject
the IRS's concession and rule that APAs are tax return information under
§ 6103.149 Finally, three anonymous companies, concerned about the impli-
cations of the IRS's concession with respect to their APAs, have requested
that the court permit them to participate as amici curia as well.150
IV. POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PUBLISHING ADVANCE
PRICING AGREEMENTS
Even if the courts decide that advance pricing agreements should be
published under current law, Congress can change the Internal Revenue
Code to specifically exempt them from publication. When Congress
adopted the confidentiality policy of § 6103, it excepted therein written de-
terminations to allow the IRS to provide general guidance to taxpayers. If
the BNA court moves the pendulum too far away from confidentiality,
Congress can and should step in to exempt advance pricing agreements
from publication.
141 See IRS Agrees to Make Redacted APAs Public, Abandons Position in Long-Standing
Lawsuit, DAILY TAX REP., Jan. 12, 1999, at GG-1.
144 See IRS Memorandum In Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, su-
pra note 25, at L-8. ("[D]efendants submit that as a result of their concession regarding the
application of Sec. 6110 to APAs, defendants have agreed to make the APAs open and
available for public inspection and copying in accordance with Sec. 6110.").
145 See id.
146 See id.
147 See IRS's Reply to BNA "s Opposition, supra note 26, at L-3; BNA's Memorandum In
Opposition to IRS's Proposed Schedule, supra note 26, at L-1.
141 See Judge Allows BNA to Propose Schedule for IRS to Make APAs Publicly Available,
DAILYTAX REp., Feb. 11, 1999, at G-7.
14 9 See Motion and Memorandum of Tax Executives Institute Regarding Amicus Curiae
Opposition, supra note 27, at L-1.
'0 See Motion by Three Companies for Leave to Participate as Amici Curiae, supra note
27, at L-5.
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A. Implications for Multilateral Corporations/APA Program
Proponents maintain that publication of advance pricing agreements is
important to ensure fair application of the tax laws to similarly situated tax-
payers by the IRS. 5  Because advance pricing agreements are not pub-
lished, the IRS has been accused of cutting secret "deals" with individual
taxpayers that are not subject to any legal standard or review. 152 Critics
have expressed grave concerns about the creation of a secret body of law .
53
Making arguments of the "sunlight is the best disinfectant" variety, these
parties seem to be appealing to the public's suspicion of the integrity of the
IRS.
Publication supporters claim that such information would provide in-
dispensable guidance to taxpayers in their efforts to properly calculate and
pay taxes.15 4 Advance pricing agreements are time-consuming and expen-
sive to obtain. The argument is that publishing advance pricing agreements
would level the playing field for smaller multinational corporations that
otherwise would not be able to afford the process.
Although some claim that democratic principles demand the publishing
of advance pricing agreements, this is a false argument. Despite its flaws,
the IRS is in fact comparatively open when contrasted with the tax authori-
ties of other democratic nations. 55 Nonetheless, as a matter of policy, Con-
151 Peter J. Meadows & William A. Dobrovir, Who Killed Guidance?, 96 TAX NOTES
TODAY 201, 245 (1996).
152 Avi-Yonah, supra note 14, at 155.
153 McIntyre, supra note 19, at 1128-29.
'-Id. at 1129.
155 Many nations have financial disclosure requirements under SEC-type regulations.
Richard D. Pomp, The Disclosure of State Corporate Income Tax Data: Turning the Clock
Back to the Future, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 373, n. 165 (1993). The Japanese government pub-
lishes lists of companies that pay the largest amounts of taxes. Id. Corporate tax liabilities
are public record in Sweden and Norway as well. Id. However, these disclosure policies are
not necessarily indicative of openness. For example, the Japanese National Tax Administra-
tion (the "NTA") publishes nonbinding circulars, internally generated instructions to tax of-
ficials interpreting the law, at its own discretion; Japan has no corollary to the Freedom of
Information Act, and the NTA is under no obligation by law to publish any of its interpreta-
tions. See Institute for International Trade Law, THE STATE OF TAXPAYERS' RIGHTS IN
JAPAN: A SURVEY OF Tim LEGAL SITUATION 113, 118, 128 (Koji Ishimura ed. 1993). Reve-
nue Canada is required to maintain the confidentiality of all taxpayer information, including
trade or business secrets of the type involved in advance pricing agreement negotiations.
Tax Management Portfolios No. 897 Foreign Income Transfer Pricing: Foreign Rules and
Practice Outside Europe, 897 TM VI.E.4. (1998). The U.K.'s Inland Revenue is similarly
governed by very strict confidentiality rules which prohibit disclosure of any information re-
ceived from taxpayers except for tax purposes, although disclosure is allowed to other na-
tions' tax authorities under tax treaties to prevent double taxation. Tax Management
Portfolios No. 895 Foreign Income Transfer Pricing: European Rules and Practice, 895 TM
W13 (1998). The French have been especially hesitant to enter into bilateral advance pricing
agreement negotiations altogether because of their strict laws against disclosure of confiden-
tial taxpayer information. The OECD, while encouraging bilateral and multilateral advance
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gress has supported broad protection of taxpayer confidentiality as essential
for a voluntary compliance system. 56 "In the tax statute, however, Congress
has decided that, with respect to tax returns, confidentiality, not sunlight, is
the proper aim.
's157
Entities contemplating the advance pricing agreement process have al-
ready expressed concern over confidentiality with respect to the extensive
disclosures required.5 To reach agreement with the IRS on the appropriate
transfer pricing methodology, a multinational corporation is required to
provide sensitive financial and proprietary technical data concerning busi-
ness organization and cost structures, relationships with controlled entities,
divisions of responsibility, and research and production activities. Required
publication of advance pricing agreements, even in redacted form, could re-
sult in a decrease in the number of such agreements sought and a corre-
sponding increase in audits and litigation over transfer pricing issues.
5 9
The court decisions requiring disclosure of other IRS documents have re-
sulted in a reduced generation of the same, so that the public has in fact re-
ceived less guidance than before.
60
Finally, there is some argument published advance pricing agreements
would not be particularly useful, anyway. Under current practice, the bases
of transfer pricing methodologies are unique to each entity's organizational,
financial, and other data, hence the extensive disclosures required by Rev.
Proc. 96-53, as discussed in Part ]161 Advance pricing agreements have
not adopted any uniform measurement, but rather reflect different meas-
urements of each taxpayer's facts and circumstances.' 62 Given the facts and
circumstances nature of transfer pricing methodologies and advance pricing
agreements, to preserve confidentiality, the IRS would have to cut out so
much information that the published version would be virtually useless for
taxpayer guidance purposes. 63
As a compromise, the IRS has indicated its intent to publish industry-
specific guidelines once enough advance pricing agreements have been ne-
pricing agreements, emphasizes the importance of confidentiality, and encourages domestic
rules against disclosure wherever possible. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Admini-
strations (Draft Text of Part II) para. 253-255, 11 TAx NoTEs INT'L 1123 (1995).
156 See discussion supra at Part III.D. concerning documents not published.
157 Aronson v. Internal Revenue Service, 973 F.2d 962, 966 (1st Cir. 1992).
158 Wrappe, supra note 32.
1s9 Tropin, supra note 30.
160 See generally Meadows & Dobrovir, supra note 151 (tracing the decline in IRS gen-
eration of various documents each time the courts require the documents to be made public).
See also Turro, supra note 32.
161 MERTENS, supra note 1, § 451.06.50.
1
62 ld.
163 See Meadows & Dobrovir, supra note 151 at 251-52 (citing Letter from John S. Nolan
to William A. Dobrovir, Aug. 27, 1996).
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gotiated in an industry to generate such guidelines.'6 One such notice has
been issued pertaining to international financial firms trading in commodi-
ties and financial derivatives. 165 The notice described the industry, then
listed the factors used and the methodology applied to those factors to cal-
culate U.S. income.
66
The IRS has certainly been less than forthcoming in providing guid-
ance with respect to transfer pricing methodologies. However, to tread
heavily on taxpayer confidentiality in response to the IRS's failure will only
exacerbate the problem. While there is no doubt that more guidance is
needed in the transfer pricing arena, this is not the best way. Instead, the
focus should be on pressuring Congress and the IRS to develop more de-
tailed general guidelines. One suggestion would be for Congress, as part of
its IRS reform efforts, to expressly declare a duty of the IRS to develop and
publish appropriate guidelines, or better yet, to do so themselves.
If BNA's goal is to glean transfer pricing policy information from ad-
vance pricing agreements and publish it for other taxpayers to use, the law-
suit will be unsuccessful in accomplishing that result. Advance pricing
agreements will most likely cease to be used, depriving the IRS and taxpay-
ers of a useful tax compliance tool.
B. Implications for Relationships with Foreign Trading Partners and U.S.
Competitiveness
Furthermore, publication of advance pricing agreements could chill the
IRS's ability to negotiate multilateral and bilateral advance pricing agree-
ments with other taxing authorities. Changes in any one nation's tax poli-
cies necessarily have economic consequences for others in such an
internationalized area as transfer pricing.167 Therefore, failing to consider
the international ramifications of a tax policy change can adversely affect
international relations.
168
Despite its early leadership in transfer pricing issues, 169 in the past sev-
eral years, the United States has not been particularly responsive to the
growing need for harmonizing its tax laws with those of other nations. 170 In
fairness, other countries have not demonstrated leadership in the transfer
pricing area, either. 171 While the advance pricing agreement program's em-
phasis on negotiating with the tax authorities of other nations is only one ef-
164Id. at 51.
165 Id. at 48, citing IRS Notice 94-40.
1
66 id.
167 Palmer, supra note 3, at 20.
168 id.
169 Lodin, supra note 14, at 240.
170 Wickham & Kerester, supra note 5, at 401.
171 Id. at 405.
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fort, it is a step in the right direction. Advance pricing agreement processes
have been developed by most if not all OECD members, as well as other
nations with which the United States has substantive trade relationships.
172
However, most of the taxing authorities with which multinational corpora-
tions and the IRS have been most successful in negotiating multilateral or
bilateral advance pricing agreements have strict confidentiality laws re-
specting taxpayer information.173 Already in response to recent develop-
ments in BNA's lawsuit,' 74 Revenue Canada has expressed concern that the
redaction process will not adequately protect Canadian taxpayer's pri-
vacy.175 Requiring the publication of advance pricing agreements in the
United States would render the non-publication policies of these nations
useless. Therefore, should the courts interpret the present law as requiring
publication of redacted advance pricing agreements, Congress should rec-
ognize the potential ramifications of such a decision and act to change the
law.
Other countries' taxing authorities have demonstrated a desire and
willingness to work with the IRS to reach tax policy compromises to ac-
complish the goals of advance pricing agreements. For example, Japanese
tax regulations require use of a different transfer pricing methodology than
prescribed in the U.S. regulations.176 However, the Japanese National Tax
Administration has agreed to adopt a hybrid combination of the two meth-
ods as a compromise for advance pricing agreements with the IRS and
multinational corporations.177 Through the advance pricing agreement pro-
cess, the IRS has expressed its willingness to work with the taxing authori-
ties of other countries to reach mutually agreeable arrangements and
compromises. 178 This is a trend which should be encouraged.
Should the IRS be required to publish advance pricing agreements, the
taxing authorities of other nations could refuse to negotiate with the IRS
under these circumstances. This refusal would reduce the ability of multi-
172 As of March, 1994, the IRS was involved in negotiating advance pricing agreements
with Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Ko-
rea, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and
Virgin Islands. Tax Management Portfolios No. 890 Foreign Income Transfer Pricing: Al-
ternative Practical Strategies, 890 TM W30 (1998).
173 See discussion supra note 155.
174 See discussion supra Part III.E.
17 5 See Canadians Concerned Redacted APAs Might Disclose Canadian Firms' Identity,
DAILY TAX REP., Mar. 4, 1999. "We are uncomfortable with the whole process. We don't
like the fact that we are going through this route." Id. (quoting the Director of Revenue
Canada's Transfer Pricing and Competent Authority Division).
176 Akamatsu, supra note 72, at 1110.
177Id. Note also that the Japanese National Taxation Administration revised its
pre-confirmation program to conform to the U.S. advance pricing agreement program. Baik
& Patton, supra note 77.
178 McIntyre, supra note 19, at 1128.
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national corporations to utilize advance pricing agreements for their United
States affiliates, yet leave them faced with severe penalties in the U.S.
should the IRS disapprove of their transfer pricing methodologies. Ulti-
mately, multinational corporations could decide to locate operations in
countries with less onerous tax policies.
This last point may be overextending the case for non-publication a lit-
tle, but not by much. From a broader perspective, as with just about every-
thing related to business these days, certain aspects of tax law are becoming
a global concern that extends outside the borders of the United States. Ac-
cordingly, national policies with respect to such tax matters should consider
the concerns and practices of other nations with whom the United States
seeks to do business.
V. CONCLUSION
The conclusion of this comment is that, regardless of the court's even-
tual decision in the BNA case, advance pricing agreements should not be
published as a matter of policy. Thus far, the United States has been the
leader in the development of transfer pricing policies. However, if we do
not consider the concerns of other nations in this area, the United States
may find itself left behind.
Advance pricing agreements are not the ultimate solution to the juris-
dictional challenges facing the world's taxing authorities. At best they are
probably a temporary solution. However, for now, advance pricing agree-
ments have proven to be an effective alternative to the litigation and uncer-
tainty that preceded their development. And, to the extent that they have
brought the world's taxing authorities to the same table, perhaps they offer
a starting point from which a true international reform effort can be estab-
lished. It would be a shame if BNA's short-sighted and narrow lawsuit re-
sulted in their extinction.
